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Does Delay Cause Decay? The Effect of Administrative Decision 
Time on the Labor Force Participation and Earnings of  
Disability Applicants 
Abstract 
An influential body of research studies the labor supply and earnings of denied Social Security 
Disability Insurance (SSDI) applicants to estimate the potential employment and earnings of 
those awarded benefits. This research design implicitly treats employability as a stable applicant 
attribute that is not directly impacted by the process of applying for SSDI benefits. If, plausibly, 
applicants’ employment potential deteriorates while they are out of the labor force, then the labor 
force participation of denied applicants -- who spend an average of 10 months seeking benefits -- 
may understate their employment potential at the time of application. This paper tests whether 
the duration of SSDI applications causally affects applicants’ subsequent employment. We use a 
unique Social Security Administration workload database to identify exogenous variation in 
applicants’ initial decision times induced by differences in processing speed among the disability 
examiners to which they are randomly assigned. This variation significantly affects applicants’ 
total processing time but, importantly, is uncorrelated with their initial award and denial 
outcomes. We find that longer processing times reduce the employment and earnings of SSDI 
applicants in the years after their initial decision. A one standard deviation (2.4 month) increase 
in initial processing time reduces annual employment rates by 1 percentage point (3.2%) in years 
two, three and four post-decision. Extrapolating these effects to total applicant processing times, 
we estimate that the SSDI determination process directly reduces the post-application 
employment of denied applicants by approximately 3.6 percentage points (7%) and allowed 
applicants by approximately 5.2 percentage points (33%). 
 1. Introduction 
An influential body of research analyzes the causal effect of receipt of Social Security 
Disability Insurance benefits (SSDI) on employment and earnings by comparing the post-
application labor force participation of those awarded benefits relative to those denied benefits.1 
Implicit in this analytic approach is the assumption that the SSDI determination process affects 
applicants’ labor supply exclusively through a single causal channel—the allowance or denial 
decision. While this channel is undoubtedly of first-order importance, the SSDI determination 
process may affect post-application labor supply through other channels as well. Of particular 
note is the fact that SSDI applicants must engage in a prolonged period of labor force non-
participation while they seek benefits. If applicants’ employment potential deteriorates while 
they are out of the labor force, then the observed, post-application labor supply of denied and 
allowed applicants may understate their employment potential at the time of SSDI application. 
Moreover, if either the rate of deterioration or average SSDI determination time differs between 
allowed and denied applicants, a comparison of their post-SSDI determination labor supply may 
not identify the pure effect of the SSDI award on employment outcomes.  
From the time that an SSDI application is filed to the time a final determination is made, 
the applicant is effectively barred from earning more than $1,000 per month in paid employment, 
since this would exceed the Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA) threshold and result in a 
summary denial of benefits. The SSDI application process is typically lengthy, with several 
levels of determination and appeal. In our administrative sample of SSDI applicants, discussed 
                                                 
1 Bound (1989) introduced the empirical approach of using the labor supply of denied SSDI applicants to form an 
upper bound on the potential labor supply of accepted applicants, an approach recently employed by von Wachter, 
Song, and Manchester (2011). Bound (1991) and Parsons (1991) debate the validity of this comparison. Several 
recent papers in this literature, including Chen and van der Klaauw (2005), French and Song (2011), and Maestas, 
Mullen and Strand (2011), exploit plausibly exogenous variation in SSDI awards to estimate the causal effect of 
receiving SSDI benefits on labor supply.    
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 below, the average time from SSDI application to final determination exceeds one year. 
Surprisingly, the mean determination time for allowed applicants significantly exceeds that of 
denied applicants (14.1 versus 9.7 months) because half of beneficiaries are allowed only after a 
lengthy appeal. Hence, both for those ultimately awarded and denied benefits, it appears 
plausible that the substantial time spent out of the labor force while applying for benefits may 
potentially have deleterious effects on skills, job readiness, and employability. 
Due to the scale of the SSDI program, even modest deleterious effects of the SSDI 
application process on the subsequent labor force participation of applicants would have 
potentially economically significant implications. More than 22 million Americans applied for 
SSDI benefits in the past ten years, with approximately six million applications filed in the most 
recent eight calendar quarters alone.2  
In this paper, we test whether the duration of the SSDI determination process affects the 
subsequent employment of allowed and denied applicants. We use a unique Social Security 
Administration workload database to identify exogenous variation in applicants’ initial decision 
times induced by differences in processing speed among the disability examiners to which they 
are randomly assigned. The average examiner in our sample spends 3 months reviewing a case 
prior to making an initial determination. Mean determination times differ substantially across 
examiners, however, with the 90/10 range in mean examiner time equal to 2.2 months. Notably, 
the characteristics of applicants assigned to each examiner and geographic variation in 
processing times explain only a modest portion of cross-examiner variation. The remaining 
variation is likely primarily attributable to productivity differentials among Social Security 
Administration (SSA) employees.  
                                                 
2 Statistics available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/dibStat.html, accessed 9/25/2011. 
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 Critical to our identification strategy, we show that this examiner-level variation in 
average processing times significantly affects applicants’ total processing time but is 
uncorrelated with initial allowance and denial outcomes. In combination with the random 
assignment of applicants to examiners within a Disability Determination Service (DDS) office, 
these findings validate our use of examiner-specific mean processing times as instrumental 
variables for the realized processing time of the cases to which they are assigned.  
Exploiting examiner-level variation, we find that longer processing times significantly 
reduce the employment and earnings of SSDI applicants in the years after their initial decision. 
Our main estimates indicate that a one standard deviation (2.4 months) increase in initial 
processing time reduces annual employment rates by about 1 percentage point (3.2%) in years 
two and three following the initial determination. This effect remains robustly significant into the 
fourth post-determination year (the final year of our observation window).  
To contextualize these numbers, we use them to estimate the impact of average applicant 
processing times on labor force participation of SSDI applicants. This calculation suggests that 
the SSDI determination process directly reduces the post-application employment of denied 
applicants by an average of approximately 3.6 percentage points (6.8%) in years two and three 
following the initial determination and, similarly, reduces the average employment of allowed 
applicants by 5.2 percentage points (33%). These calculations are arguably conservative because 
they ignore the fixed cost of any labor force withdrawal on subsequent employment.  
Importantly, this paper presents the first causal estimates of the effect of application 
processing time on the subsequent labor supply of disability applicants. We show that the 
employment decay effect is a distinct causal channel through which the SSDI program impacts 
post-application labor supply outcomes—separate from the benefit receipt effect, which has been 
3
 the exclusive focus of the literature to date.  Combining the labor supply decay effect with a 
credible estimate of the benefit receipt effect suggests that the SSDI program effect on 
employment is nearly 25 percent larger than previously thought. 
 
2. Background on SSDI 
In order to apply for SSDI benefits, applicants must first reduce their earnings below 
SSA’s threshold for “substantial gainful activity” (SGA), which is currently set at $1,000 per 
month. Individuals apply for SSDI benefits at their local field office, which screens out those 
who are not currently insured or who are engaging in SGA (earning more than $1,000 per 
month). Applications screened out at this level are labeled “technical denials,” and do not receive 
a medical review. The remaining applications are forwarded to a state Disability Determination 
Services (DDS) office, where cases are assigned to disability examiners for review on a 
rotational basis. Exceptions to rotational assignment include high-priority cases flagged as 
potential terminal illness cases and, in some offices, cases with specific body system codes going 
to new examiners who are still in a “training” period which varies across DDS office. Otherwise, 
cases were randomly assigned to disability examiners within DDS office. See Maestas, Mullen 
and Strand (2011) for more details on the assignment process.  
SSA employs a five-step review process in order to determine whether an applicant meets 
the definition of disabled – that is, unable to perform SGA given the severity of his impairment 
and/or vocational background (age, education and work experience). Figure 1 illustrates this 
process. The process is meant to resolve cases relatively quickly for applicants in both extremes 
of the severity distribution. Applicants with impairments that are obviously temporary or non-
severe are denied in step 2, and applicants with specific impairments deemed severe enough to 
4
 warrant allowance into the program regardless of vocational background (i.e., they meet the 
criteria for “medical listings”) are allowed in step 3. The remaining determinations take into 
account vocational considerations. Applicants who are deemed able to perform any of their past 
jobs are denied at step 4. Finally, applicants who are deemed able to perform any work in the 
current economy are denied, and applicants who are deemed unable to do any work are allowed, 
at step 5. These vocational allowance determinations are made in consultation with a medical-
vocational grid which provides guidance based on residual functional capacity, age group, 
education and type of work experience (i.e., skilled, unskilled).  
Denied applicants can appeal their initial determination, and the appeals process differs 
for applicants in “non-prototype” and “prototype” states. Before 1999, the procedure was the 
same in all states. Denied applicants could reapply for reconsideration by the original DDS office 
within 60 days of the initial determination. Applicants denied at reconsideration had an 
additional 60 days to file an appeal to have an administrative law judge (ALJ) review their case.  
In 1999, however, ten prototype states eliminated the reconsideration step of the appeals process 
and now applicants wishing to appeal in these states go directly to an ALJ. The states are: 
Alabama, Alaska, California (Los Angeles North and Los Angeles), Colorado (West), Louisiana, 
Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York and Pennsylvania. Applicants denied by an 
ALJ have additional opportunities to appeal to an SSA Appeals Council (AC) and finally to 
Federal Court. Figure 2 illustrates the different stages of the appeals process. At any stage in the 
appeals process the applicant can present new evidence. Appealing an initial determination can 
add several months and even years to the applicant’s waiting time for a decision. An alternative 
path to overturning an initial determination is to submit a new application (“reapplication”).  
5
 If an allowance is made, benefits commence after a five-month waiting period (from the 
alleged onset date) in which individuals may not perform SGA. Beneficiaries notified after the 
waiting period has elapsed may receive up to 19 months of back-dated benefits, but importantly 
they cannot go back in time to re-enter the labor market. Once the waiting period is over, 
beneficiaries enter a (not necessarily consecutive) nine-month Trial Work Period (TWP) and 
three-month Grace Period in which they may earn more than the SGA threshold without having 
their benefits suspended. Beneficiaries exhausting the TWP and Grace Period then enter a three-
year extended period of eligibility (EPE) in which benefits are paid for months in which earnings 
are below SGA, and not paid when earnings are above SGA.  
 
3. Model and Empirical Strategy 
We begin with a causal model of labor supply of the following form: 
i i i i i iy X t DI sβ δ γ ε= + + − + ,  (1) 
where is observed post-application labor supply of applicant i, denotes observed 
characteristics that influence labor supply (e.g., age, impairment),  is applicant i’s application 
processing time measured in months from the date of application until the date of allowance or 
final denial,   if the applicant was ultimately allowed benefits (i.e., is observed to be a 
SSDI beneficiary within 5 years of the initial determination), denotes unobserved impairment 
severity measured in terms of lost labor supply, and  is an idiosyncratic error term. The causal 
parameter of interest is , which measures the labor supply decay rate, that is the loss in labor 
supply caused by an additional month of application processing time.  
iy iX
it
1iDI =
is
iε
δ
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 Importantly, the decay rate is conceptually distinct from the causal effect of benefit 
receipt, , which has been the exclusive focus of the research literature to date.  Figure 3 
illustrates how the two effects are related. The vertical axis in Figure 3 measures post-application 
labor supply while the horizontal axis measures the application processing time .  The 
downward-sloping line in red gives post-application labor supply as a function of processing 
time for a denied applicant. The slope of the line is the decay rate . The slope of the 
corresponding green line for allowed applicants is assumed to be as for denied applicants with 
the same observed and unobserved characteristics as allowed applicants (that is, the 
allowance/denial decision can be thought of as the only difference between these groups of 
applicants).  
Suppose applications were evaluated instantaneously at . Then point A is the 
observed post-application labor supply of the denied applicant, point C is the observed post-
application labor supply of the allowed applicant, and the distance AC measures , the causal 
effect of SSDI benefit receipt. In practice, however, applications are not evaluated 
instantaneously, so post-application labor supply is observed only after a period of processing 
time. If both allowed and denied applicants have application processing time it t= , and the 
labor supply decay rate is the same for each, then the effect of processing time on labor supply is 
given by . The combined effect of SSDI on labor supply operating through these two causal 
channels—processing time plus benefit receipt—is then .  As noted above, the research 
literature has focused on estimating . The objective of this paper is to estimate .  
A key challenge for consistently estimating is that impairment severity,  , may affect 
processing time; that is, SSA may process severely ill applicants more rapidly than more 
δ
γ
iy it
δ−
0t =
γ
tδ
tγ δ+
γ δ
δ is
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 ambiguous cases because the former are allowed at step 3 (i.e., meeting the listing) rather than at 
step 5 (i.e., capacity for any job) or on a subsequent appeal.  If processing time is shorter for 
more severe ailments and  is imperfectly observed, then OLS estimates of will be biased 
upward (towards zero)—that is, they will underestimate the decay rate. Intuitively, applicants 
with shorter processing times will be observed to have relatively low post-application labor 
supply (due to their unobservably poor health) while those with longer processing times will 
have higher post-application labor supply due to their relatively good health. In this case, 
estimates of the decay rate would be confounded with the direct effect of health on labor supply 
and would understate the health-constant adverse effect of additional waiting time on subsequent 
labor supply.  
To overcome this confound, we employ an empirical strategy similar to that used by 
Maestas, Mullen and Strand (2011, MMS hereafter) to estimate the effect of SSDI benefit receipt 
on labor supply ( ). MMS present evidence that DDS examiners differ in the implicit thresholds 
that they employ when judging the severity of a disability. All else equal, applications sent to 
low-threshold examiners are more likely to be allowed than others whereas those sent to high-
threshold examiners are more likely to be denied. MMS observe that because applications are 
randomly assigned to examiners, examiner-specific allowance rates can be used to instrument for 
the ultimate allowance decision for individual applicants, thereby identifying the causal effect of 
the allowance decision on labor supply.  
In a similar vein to MMS, we take advantage of the fact that DDS examiners also vary 
considerably in their rate of processing disability applications; some DDS examiners are 
considerably faster than others. Using the random assignment of cases to DDS examiners, this 
natural variation in examiner processing speed during the initial determination phase generates 
is δ
γ
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 exogenous variation in total processing time (which includes time spent in the appellate phases) 
which is uncorrelated with applicants’ unobserved severity is . Thus, we can use examiner 
assignments to isolate exogenous variation in applicant processing times that is independent of 
impairment severity. The instrumental variable we employ in our analysis is the average 
processing time of examiner j to which applicant i is randomly assigned, excluding applicant i’s 
own processing time: 
, 1
1
1 jN
ij kk i k
j
EXTIME t
N ≠ =−
= ∑ . 
While this identification strategy breaks the correlation between  and , there remains 
the possibility of a correlation between the instrument  and the indicator for ultimate 
allowance, .3 As we show later in Table 8, while  is not correlated with the 
likelihood of initial allowance, it is positively correlated with both the likelihood of appeal and, 
ultimately, with the likelihood of benefit receipt. That is, all else equal, an applicant initially 
denied by a slower DDS examiner is more likely to appeal than one denied by a faster DDS 
examiner. This could plausibly arise if an applicant assigned to a slower examiner experiences a 
greater decay in employability in the initial determination phase (as implied by Figure 3), and 
consequently has a lower opportunity cost of remaining out of the labor force while pursuing an 
appeal.  
The reduced form effect of on labor supply encompasses the total effect of 
DDS examiner processing speed—the direct effect of processing time on labor supply and an 
indirect effect of processing time operating through the channels of appeal and subsequent 
benefit receipt. The IV estimate of (instrumenting for  with ) attributes both direct 
                                                 
3 Note that iDI is also an endogenous regressor correlated with is . 
it is
ijEXTIME
iDI ijEXTIME
ijEXTIME
δ it ijEXTIME
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 and indirect effects to . In Figure 3, the gray dashed line shows how if the decay rate includes 
both the direct and indirect effects, the reduction in labor supply attributed to processing time is 
larger (distance  instead of AB) and includes part of the effect of benefit receipt already 
captured by . Because of this overlap in the estimates, one cannot simply add the decay effect 
to the benefit receipt effect as shown above, ; doing so would overstate the impact of 
SSDI.  
The direct effect can potentially be isolated, however, by estimating  on the subsample 
of initially allowed applicants, since for these applicants there is no appeal and as we show later 
is uncorrelated with the probability of initial allowance—which in this case is 
equivalent to ultimate allowance. The key assumption underlying this strategy is that the true 
decay parameter  is the same for both allowed and denied applicants (when this is the case, 
distance AB=CD in Figure 3).4  
Figure 3 also shows how a correlation between processing time and ultimate benefit 
receipt can similarly affect the estimate of  in a regression of labor supply on benefit receipt, 
when processing time is omitted as an (endogenous) regressor.  If, for example, the ultimately 
allowed applicant experiences a longer processing time than the denied applicant, , then the 
estimated  will include both the direct effect of allowance on labor supply (distance BD) plus 
an indirect effect from the decay associated with the additional processing time (distance 
). However, with an unbiased estimate of  and known average processing 
times for allowed and denied applicants, the direct effect of benefit receipt on labor supply can 
                                                 
4 This assumption is fundamentally untestable. Although in Table 6, the estimated decay parameter is smaller for the 
initially allowed than for the initially denied, estimates produced using the initially denied sample include both 
direct and indirect effects (and thus should be bigger). It remains possible, however, that the decay parameter is in 
reality smaller for allowed applicants, either due to the income or substitution effects of SSDI receipt, both of which 
would be expected to reduce labor overall force participation in this group.   
it
AB′
γ
tγ δ+
δ
ijEXTIME
δ
γ
t t′ >
γ
( )DD t tδ′ ′= − δ
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 be recovered by subtracting   from the estimated .  With this adjustment, one could 
construct an estimate of the combined effects of benefit receipt and decay, . In the next 
sections, we present our estimate of and discuss the combined effects of SSDI on labor supply 
operating through both the decay and benefit receipt channels.  
 
4. Data and Caseload Characteristics 
We make use of a unique workload management database called the Disability 
Operational Data Store (DIODS) which temporarily stores information about the universe of 
initial and reconsideration disability decisions that are recorded in the National Disability 
Determination Service System. The main advantage of the DIODS over other data sets is that it 
includes alphanumeric codes linking applicants to the DDS examiner who considered their case. 
Our extract was made in December 2009 and contains data on all initial medical determinations 
(that is, excluding technical denials) made in 2005. We restrict our sample to primary claimants 
(i.e., excluding dependents) for adults ages 18-64 assigned to examiners handling at least 10 such 
cases (and fewer than 900 cases) in 2005. In addition to the outcome of the determination, the 
DIODS includes information on application filing date, date of receipt at the DDS office (after 
being forwarded from the field office) and the date of determination. We compute – 
our leave-one-out measure of examiner processing time – using time at DDS (date of 
determination minus date of receipt at DDS). The results of reconsideration decisions for 
applications initially denied in 2005 were obtained from a DIODS extract including decisions 
through the end of 2006. An audit study performed by the Office of the Inspector General (2008) 
found that on average reconsiderations were processed within 94 days of their initial 
determination in 2006, including the 60 day window that applicants have to initiate an appeal. 
( )t tδ ′ − γ
tγ δ+
δ
ijEXTIME
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 In order to measure total waiting time for applicants who appealed beyond the 
reconsideration level, we link the DIODS sample to data on ALJ hearings from the Case 
Processing and Management System (CPMS), where we observe the date of decision for both 
affirmations and reversals (through June 2011). We do not directly observe cases that proceed to 
higher levels of the appeals process (Appeals Council and/or Federal Court); however, we are 
able to identify decision dates for cases that were allowed at later stages of the appeals process, 
or through reapplication, by linking to the Payment History Update System (PHUS) and Master 
Beneficiary Record (MBR). For classification purposes, we count cases where the applicant 
received an SSDI payment but was observed as a denial at the ALJ stage as a “higher appeals” 
decision, whereas we count cases where an applicant received an SSDI payment before the ALJ-
level decision or was not observed to file an ALJ claim as a “reapplication.” We observe these 
payments through December 2010.  
For a small fraction of cases denied at upper levels of the appeals process or through 
reapplication, and for any cases still in process more than 5 years after the initial determination, 
we will underestimate true waiting time. Table A1 shows the percentage of claimants initially 
denied in 2005 who were subsequently denied by an ALJ and who are later observed receiving 
benefits, as well as the percentage of claimants initially denied in 2005 who we do not observe 
initiating an appeal and who are later observed receiving benefits (i.e., through reapplication). 
For both types of cases, less than 15% are observed receiving benefits 5 years after their initial 
denial. Thus, assuming conservatively that half of individuals in these groups were denied at 
later stages (which we do not observe) or were still in process, then the final processing times of 
12
 no more than 7,826 applicants are censored at their ALJ decision (0.7% of the sample) and no 
more than 44,773 applicants are censored at their initial determination (4% of the sample).5 
Finally, we observe labor market outcomes by linking our sample to the Detailed 
Earnings Record (DER) that gives uncapped annual earnings from box 5 (Medicare wages and 
tips) of individuals’ W2 tax forms. We observe earnings up to and including 2009. In order to 
ensure that the earnings records represent a full year of potential work, we link to the date of 
death information in the Numerical Identification System (NUMIDENT) and restrict the sample 
to applicants who were alive through the end of the calendar year in which earnings are 
observed. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our sample, overall and separately for applicants 
in non-prototype vs. prototype states, and by initial and final allowance decision. Three-quarters 
of applicants are in non-prototype states vs. one-quarter in states that have streamlined the 
appeals process by eliminating reconsideration. Although only one-third of applicants are 
allowed at the initial determination stage, two-thirds of applicants ultimately receive benefits. 
Indeed, more than half of all initially denied applicants were receiving SSDI benefits by 2010, 
five years after their initial determination. Examiner waiting time, or ijEXTIME , is 3 months on 
average and balanced across the different groups. Applicants in prototype states, while slightly 
less likely to appeal an initial denial, were more likely to be allowed on appeal. Slightly more 
applicants were observed to receive benefits by 2010 in prototype vs. non-prototype states. 
Approximately half of SSDI claims are concurrent with claims for Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI), which pays additional benefits to disabled individuals with limited income 
                                                 
5 In reality it is likely that applicants who choose to reapply rather than pursue an appeal have higher success rates 
(e.g., their functional limitations worsened or they more fully documented their existing limitations). 
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 (counting SSDI) and resources. Applications are assigned to examiners and evaluated the same 
way for concurrent and non-concurrent applications.  
Fewer than 1% of applications are flagged as high priority terminal illness cases, and 
these cases have disproportionately high allowance rates. On average, applicants are 46.7 years 
old at the time of their initial determination, and have low pre-onset earnings - $22,729 (in 
2008$) averaged over the 3-5 years prior to initial determination. Earnings and employment 2-4 
years after the initial determination are also low, and falling over time. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for application processing times measured in months, 
separately for non-prototype and prototype states. Panel A displays cumulative waiting times at 
different administrative levels, and Panel B displays the time the application spent at the DDS 
office, for all applications and grouped by final stage of the disability determination process (see 
Figure 1). On average, applicants wait just under 4 months for an initial determination from the 
date they filed the application. The median waiting time is slightly smaller – 3.4 and 3.3 months 
for applications in non-prototype and prototype states, respectively. Approximately 10% of 
applications in both types of states have initial waiting times of 6 months or longer. About 3 
months of this time is spent at the DDS office under review by a DDS examiner. As expected, 
applications that were allowed or denied at earlier stages in the disability determination process 
have shorter waiting times on average than applications evaluated at later stages that incorporate 
vocational criteria. 
Even if there is wide variation in initial waiting times at the applicant level, if applicants 
are (conditionally) randomly assigned to examiners it does not necessarily follow that there is 
significant variation in average waiting times at the examiner level. Table A2 presents summary 
statistics at the examiner level and Figure 4 presents a kernel-density smoothed histogram of 
14
 deviations in examiner time from average time at DDS (3 months), unadjusted and adjusted for 
case-mix differences. (That is, we first regress ijEXTIME  on DDS dummies and fraction of cases 
with the following characteristics: 3-digit zip code, body system code, flag for terminal illness 
(high priority case), age group, average pre-onset earnings and concurrent status; and we plot the 
residuals from this regression.) Adjusting for case-mix differences tightens the distribution of 
examiner times, reducing the standard deviation from 1 month to 0.68 months, but there is still a 
significant amount of variation in average waiting times at the DDS level. 
Despite having initial waiting times of generally less than 6 months, SSDI applicants 
spend more than 1 year waiting for a final decision, and 10% of cases spend almost 3 years or 
longer, as they navigate a complex system of appeals. In the non-prototype states, initially denied 
applicants who appeal for reconsideration wait an additional 5 months for a decision on average, 
and applicants further appealing to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) wait an additional 2 
years. Despite eliminating the reconsideration step in the prototype states, applicants appealing 
directly to the ALJ level waited only 3.9 fewer months than applicants appealing to an ALJ after 
being denied at reconsideration (although more applicants reached the ALJ stage in prototype 
states than in non-prototype states). Generally, applicants in prototype states do not appear to 
have significantly shorter waiting times than applicants in non-prototype states. 
 Although we only observe waiting times for individuals who are ultimately allowed at 
later stages of the appeals process (Federal Court or Appeals Council), we see that this process 
adds an average of 15.1 months in non-prototype states and 15.9 months in prototype states, for 
cumulative waiting times of 47.5 and 44.5 months, respectively, (almost 4 years) for this small 
fraction of applications. Finally, about 2.6% of applicants were observed to receive benefits even 
though we observe no appeals decision, presumably awarded through an additional application, 
15
 and the benefits are received about 33 months from the filing of the initial application. If we 
assume that approximately equal numbers of applicants at these stages were denied (which we do 
not observe) then we can conclude that we underestimate average time to last decision by 1 
month at most among all applicants.  
Table 3 breaks down average time at DDS and total waiting time (i.e., time to last 
observed decision) by ultimate disposition of the case. There are not large differences in initial 
waiting times among any of these groups, but whether an applicant goes on to appeal has a very 
large impact on final waiting time. (As discussed above, due to data restrictions final waiting 
times are slightly understated for applicants who were ultimately not allowed.) Thus, applicants 
who appealed their initial determination spent six times longer waiting for a decision, regardless 
of the ultimate disposition of the case. However, because approximately half of ultimately 
awarded applicants pursued an appeal or reapplication, whereas less than one-third of ultimately 
denied applicants did, average final waiting times are 4.4 months longer for those ultimately 
allowed. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 First Stage Regressions 
Table 4 presents first-stage regression estimates of the effect of our instrument ijEXTIME
on it , applicant time until final decision, for the full sample of SSDI applicants and particular 
subsamples.  In each column, we display the coefficient on ijEXTIME obtained under three 
different specifications. The first specification is an OLS regression specification with no 
controls. The second is a specification that includes the “assignment variables” (DDS indicators, 
terminal illness flag, and body system code); that is, the variables that determine to which 
16
 examiner a case is assigned, and which are necessary for our assumption of conditional random 
assignment.  The third specification further adds applicant characteristics (age, pre-disability 
earnings, three-digit zip code), and is included as a randomization test—if the coefficient on 
ijEXTIME is robust to the inclusion of individual characteristics, then our assumption of 
conditional random assignment is supported.  
In the full sample (first column), the coefficient on ijEXTIME exceeds one when we omit 
the necessary examiner assignment variables, but falls to 0.986 once they are included. In other 
words, a one month increase in examiner processing time leads to a nearly one-month increase in 
applicant time until final decision. The estimate is statistically unchanged once we add applicant 
characteristics, indicating that ijEXTIME is not correlated with applicant characteristics (after 
conditioning on the assignment variables).6  
We show the same sequence of first-stage coefficients separately for applicants who are 
initially allowed and initially denied and for applicants in non-prototype and prototype states.  In 
the initially allowed sample, the first-stage coefficient is 0.847; the attenuation away from 1 is 
somewhat surprising since the initially allowed do not pursue appeals, and hence final time is 
uncensored and equal to initial processing time.  The attenuation is most likely due to noise in
ijEXTIME , which is computed over finite examiner caseloads.  This suggests that in samples in 
which appeals are possible, the coefficient on ijEXTIME should be at least as large as it is in the 
initially allowed sample, given that ijEXTIME is positively correlated with the probability of 
subsequent appeal (see Table 8). This is indeed the case for the initially denied sample (as well 
as the full sample), where the first-stage coefficient is 1.06; in other words, the “appeal effect” of 
                                                 
6 The incremental F-statistic = 307, which indicates a strong first stage. 
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 ijEXTIME  offsets the “small-sample attenuation effect” of ijEXTIME .  The coefficients for the 
non-prototype states are similar to those for the full sample, which is not surprising since three-
quarters of applicants in our sample are in non-prototype states. The first-stage coefficient 
(conditional on assignment variables) for the prototype states is only 0.832, which points to less 
of an offsetting appeal effect in prototype states, where the absence of a reconsideration stage 
means shorter waiting times conditional on appeal. 
 
5.2 Reduced Form Effect of Examiner Time on Labor Supply Outcomes 
We next turn to the reduced form effect of ijEXTIME on three post-application labor 
supply outcomes: labor force participation (defined as annual earnings>$1,000), substantial 
gainful activity (defined as annual earnings> annualized SGA), and annual earnings. Each labor 
supply outcome is evaluated 2, 3, and 4 years after the initial decision in 2005, corresponding to 
calendar years 2007, 2008, and 2009, respectively. Reduced form models are of interest because 
they provide causal estimates without the need to specify exact causal channels. 
Table 5 presents the reduced form coefficients on ijEXTIME estimated over the full 
sample. In Panel A, a one-month increase in examiner processing time reduces the probability of 
labor force participation 2 years after the initial decision by -0.005 (½ of a percentage point). The 
effect is the same at 3 years. The somewhat smaller effect at 4 years is likely due to weak 
employment conditions in 2009. All of the coefficients are precisely estimated and statistically 
different from zero. In Panel B, a one-month increase in examiner processing time reduces the 
probability of engaging in substantial gainful activity 2 years after the initial decision by -0.0019 
(also statistically significant). The effect is similar at 3 and 4 years. In Panel C, a one-month 
increase in examiner processing time leads to a $75 reduction in annual earnings 2 years after the 
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 initial decision; the effect declines slightly at 3 and 4 years, but the coefficients are not 
statistically different from one another. 
Table 6 presents reduced form coefficients on ijEXTIME estimated for the initially 
allowed and initially denied samples. In the allowed sample, a one-month increase in examiner 
processing time reduces the probability of labor force participation 2 years after the initial 
decision by -0.003 (about 1/3 of a percentage point). The effect is similar at 3 and 4 years. The 
reduced form effects of examiner processing time on substantial gainful activity and on earnings 
are mostly imprecisely estimated.  The effects are uniformly larger in the initially denied sample; 
this is because as noted earlier in Section 3, the reduced form effect of ijEXTIME in a sample in 
which appeals are possible encompasses both its direct effect of labor supply and its indirect 
effect on ultimate benefit receipt operating through the appellate channel. In the initially denied 
sample, a one-month increase in examiner processing time leads to a larger -0.006 reduction in 
the probability of labor force participation at 2 years, a -0.0028 reduction in the probability of 
substantial gainful activity at 2 years, and a $100 reduction in annual earnings at 2 years after the 
initial decision. The effects at 3 and 4 years after the initial decision are of similar magnitude. 
Table 7 shows these same reduced form relationships separately for applicants in non-
prototype and prototype states. Since non-prototype states comprise three-quarters of the full 
sample, the estimates are similar to those reported in Table 5. However, the reduced form 
estimates for the prototype states are uniformly larger. This is suggestive of a larger indirect 
“appeals effect” of examiner processing time on labor supply (coming from increased benefit 
receipt) in prototype states than in non-prototype states. This is because, as we will show in 
Table 8, ijEXTIME exerts a stronger effect on benefit receipt in prototype states than in non-
prototype states. 
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5.3 Conditional Pathways 
 As described above, the reduced form effect of ijEXTIME  on labor supply outcomes 
encompasses both a direct effect on applicant processing time and an indirect effect through the 
channel of the appeals process, which affects ultimate benefit receipt. In Table 8, we investigate 
these relationships by examining the effect of ijEXTIME  on conditional waiting times and 
pathways through the disability determination process, separately for non-prototype and 
prototype states. Each row represents a regression on a different outcome: cumulative time from 
filing to decision at a given administrative level, conditional on participation at that level; 
probability of appeal, conditional on denial at the previous level; and probability of denial at a 
given administrative level, conditional on participation at that level. The last two rows in each 
panel provide estimates encompassing the cumulative effects of ijEXTIME  on final processing 
time (time to last observed decision in our data set) and SSDI benefit receipt among all 
applicants. Each regression contains the full set of controls and computes standard errors 
clustered on DDS examiner. 
 In both non-prototype and prototype states, ijEXTIME  has almost a one-for-one impact 
on initial processing time; that is, a one-month increase in the examiner’s average time increases 
applicants’ initial processing times (at the DDS level) by almost one month. Importantly for our 
analysis below, ijEXTIME  is shown to have no effect on the probability of initial denial; in other 
words, slow examiners are no more likely to be lenient or strict than fast examiners.  
However, being denied by a slow examiner does make one more likely to appeal to the 
next level (reconsideration in the non-prototype states or ALJ in the prototype states). This may 
be because applicants’ opportunity cost of appealing has been reduced by the longer initial 
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 processing time, through its impact on prospective employment, or it could be because applicants 
infer something about their chances of prevailing upon appeal given the initial examiner’s 
tardiness. In any case, this higher likelihood of appeal directly translates into a higher probability 
of benefit receipt, and a longer final processing time. Assignment to an examiner who is one 
month slower on average yields a statistically significant increase in the probability of benefit 
receipt of 0.31 percentage points (0.5%) in a non-prototype state and 0.56 percentage points 
(0.8%) in a prototype state. As a result, we confine our IV analysis to applicants who were 
initially allowed in 2005, since ijEXTIME  is uncorrelated with the initial allowance decision, 
which equals the final allowance decision in this case.
  
 
5.4 OLS and IV Estimates of the Effect of Time to Decision on Labor Supply Outcomes 
In Table 9, we show OLS and IV estimates of the effect of time to final decision on labor 
supply outcomes evaluated 2, 3, and 4 years after the initial decision in 2005.  In all cases, the 
estimates are for the initially allowed sample only, since as noted above, this is the only sample 
in which we can recover the pure direct effect of processing time. As expected, the OLS 
estimates are uniformly smaller than the IV estimates. Our IV estimates of the effect of a one-
month increase in time until final decision on labor force participation are -0.00369 2 years after 
the initial decision. The IV estimate rises slightly at 3 years after the initial decision (-0.00471) 
and falls slightly at 4 years (-0.00323), but the coefficients are not statistically different. The IV 
estimates for the substantial gainful activity and earnings outcomes are imprecisely estimated, 
though similar in magnitude to the reduced form coefficients in Table 6. 
As described in Section 3, our IV estimate is an estimate of the employment decay rate, 
δ . Multiplying the decay rate by average processing times for SSDI applicants gives an estimate 
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 of the average labor supply decay effect. Among all applicants, for whom the average processing 
time is 12.7 months, we estimate an average decay in post-application employment of 4.4 
percentage points (16%).  The decay effect is notably larger for applicants who pursue an appeal. 
Regardless of the ultimate decision, applicants who are denied in the initial determination phase 
and who pursue appeals are, on average, 7.6 percentage points less likely to work 2 years after 
the initial determination compared to applicants who do not pursue appeals. This highlights the 
appeals process as a particularly costly avenue for obtaining SSDI benefits. 
 
6. Conclusion 
A well-known body of research explores how the award of SSDI benefits affects the 
labor supply and earnings of recipients. In this paper we explore a complementary—and we 
believe equally consequential—question:  how do long application processing time, during 
which applicants are effectively barred from earning more than $1,000 per month, affect the 
subsequent employment of denied applicants and SSDI beneficiaries?  Our approach exploits 
exogenous variation in average processing time by disability examiners as an instrument for 
applicant waiting time.  Using a unique administrative workload database, we evaluate how the 
substantial time spent out of the labor market during the application and appeals process – more 
than one year on average, across all applicants – affects subsequent employment opportunities 
and earnings of both allowed and denied applicants.  
We find that longer processing times significantly reduce the employment and earnings 
of SSDI applicants in the years after their initial decision. Our main estimates indicate that a one 
standard deviation (2.4 months) increase in initial processing time reduces annual employment 
rates by about 1 percentage point (3.2%) in the years following the initial determination. 
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 Extrapolating these effects to total applicant processing times, we estimate that the SSDI 
determination process directly reduces the post-application employment of denied applicants by 
approximately 3.6 percentage points (7%) and allowed applicants by approximately 5.2 
percentage points (33%).  
The literature to date has been exclusively focused on estimating the causal effect of 
benefit receipt on labor supply outcomes. Importantly, this paper presents the first causal 
estimates of the labor supply decay effect, which is an additional cost of the SSDI determination 
process. We show that the decay effect is a distinct causal channel through which the SSDI 
program impacts post-application labor supply outcomes.  Combining the labor supply decay 
effect (4.4 percentage points for the average applicant) with a credible estimate of the benefit 
receipt effect (e.g., 18 percentage points as reported in MMS 2011) suggests that the SSDI 
program effect on employment is nearly 25 percent larger than previously thought. 
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Variable All
Non‐
Prototype Prototype
Initially 
Allowed
Initially 
Denied
Finally 
Allowed
Finally 
Denied
% of sample 100.0% 75.1% 24.9% 33.1% 66.9% 66.7% 33.3%
Examiner processing time (EXTIME) 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.8
(0.8) (0.8) (0.7) (0.8) (0.8) (0.8) (0.8)
Initial allowance rate 33.1% 32.6% 34.9% 100.0% 0.0% 49.6% 0.0%
Appeal (recon or ALJ) | initial denial 59.7% 61.1% 55.1% 0.0% 59.7% 88.2% 30.8%
Appeal allowance rate | appeal 69.6% 66.1% 81.6% ‐‐ 69.6% 93.7% 0.0%
DI Beneficiary by 2010 66.7% 66.0% 71.4% 100.0% 54.8% 100.0% 0.0%
Concurrent claim 51.2% 51.8% 49.5% 40.8% 56.4% 45.9% 61.8%
Terminal illness 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 2.0% 0.2% 1.1% 0.2%
Age 46.7 46.7 46.4 50.4 44.8 48.7 42.6
(11.0) (11.0) (11.1) (10.8) (10.6) (10.2) (11.4)
Earnings (2008$)
   3‐5 years prior 22,729 22,330 23,931 28,890 19,676 26,140 15,885
(27,867) (27,861) (27,850) (34,087) (23,612) (29,892) (21,718)
   2 years later 4,319 4,337 4,266 1,947 5,494 2,037 8,897
(12,529) (12,758) (11,809) (12,356) (12,447) (10,581) (14,693)
   3 years later 4,293 4,295 4,287 1,960 5,424 1,829 9,164
(11,843) (11,757) (12,098) (9,964) (12,498) (8,760) (15,169)
   4 years later 3,924 3,915 3,951 1,866 4,898 1,572 8,485
(12,001) (12,134) (11,592) (11,670) (12,032) (9,516) (14,703)
Employed  (earning more than $1,000)
   2 years later 27.8% 28.1% 26.9% 13.8% 34.8% 15.5% 52.4%
   3 years later 26.4% 26.5% 25.9% 13.4% 32.7% 13.6% 51.7%
   4 years later 23.5% 23.6% 23.2% 12.1% 28.9% 11.2% 47.3%
Performing SGA (earning more than real 
SGA threshold)
   2 years later 13.3% 13.5% 12.7% 4.5% 17.6% 5.3% 29.3%
   3 years later 13.2% 13.3% 12.9% 4.6% 17.4% 4.6% 30.1%
   4 years later 11.6% 11.6% 11.4% 4.1% 15.1% 3.6% 27.0%
n 1,128,388 847,221 281,167 373,851 754,537 753,038 375,350
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 1. Summary Statistics
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% Cases Mean Std. Dev. 50th Perc. 90th Perc. % Cases Mean Std. Dev. 50th Perc. 90th Perc.
Time to Initial Decision 100.0 3.9 2.4 3.4 6.4 100.0 3.6 2.2 3.3 5.9
Time to Reconsideration Decision 36.3 8.9 4.0 8.1 14.1 ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐
Time to ALJ Decision 28.7 32.6 15.2 29.6 56.3 35.6 28.7 15.7 25.4 53.7
Time to Higher Appeals Decision* 1.7 47.5 11.9 47.4 63.4 0.7 44.5 12.8 43.5 62.1
Time to Reapplication Decision* 2.6 32.7 17.3 31.1 59.0 2.6 33.6 16.8 31.3 59.5
Time to Last Observed Decision 100.0 12.7 15.2 5.4 35.2 100.0 12.6 15.3 4.7 33.6
% Cases Mean Std. Dev. 50th Perc. 90th Perc. % Cases Mean Std. Dev. 50th Perc. 90th Perc.
All 100.0 3.0 2.2 2.7 5.2 100.0 2.8 1.6 2.5 4.8
Denied: Impairment not severe 18.0 2.7 1.6 2.3 4.7 14.4 2.5 1.4 2.2 4.4
Allowed: Meets the listings 14.7 2.5 1.8 2.2 4.9 13.4 2.3 1.7 1.9 4.5
Denied: Capacity for past work 25.0 3.1 1.6 2.9 5.3 21.4 2.9 1.5 2.7 4.8
Allowed/Denied: Other Capacity 42.4 3.2 1.8 2.9 5.4 50.8 2.9 1.5 2.7 4.9
              † Technical denials are excluded from our sample.
Non‐Prototype States Prototype States
Table 2. SSDI Processing Times in Months
Notes: * indicates we only observe time to decision at these stages if the final decision is allowance
A. Cumulative Processing Times, by Administrative Level
B. Time at DDS, by Step†
Non‐Prototype States Prototype States
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Initially Allowed
Allowed on Appeal 
or Reapplication
Initially Denied, No 
Appeal
Initially Denied, 
Denied on Appeal
No. observations 373,851 379,187 259,652 115,698
Percentage 33.1% 33.6% 23.0% 10.3%
Time at DDS 2.8 3.1 2.8 2.9
(1.8) (1.6) (1.6) (1.6)
Total Processing Time 3.8 24.3 3.7c 23.2c
(2.7) (16.3) (2.2) (19.2)
Total Processing Time, Pooled
Table 3. Mean Processing Time by Outcome
14.1 9.7c
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. c denotes censored due to unobserved higher level appeals and/or reapplications.
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Table 4: First Stage Regressions of Time to Final Decision on Examiner's Average Processing Time
All
Initially 
Allowed
Initially 
Denied
Non‐
Prototype Prototype
EXTIME 1.471*** 0.906*** 1.574*** 1.616*** 0.821***
‐0.0454 ‐0.0103 ‐0.0423 ‐0.0503 ‐0.108
R^2 0.006 0.072 0.006 0.008 0.001
Plus assignment variables 0.986*** 0.847*** 1.062*** 1.027*** 0.832***
(0.02870) (0.01190) (0.03440) (0.03180) (0.06640)
R^2 0.047 0.119 0.027 0.051 0.037
Plus individual characteristics 0.966*** 0.840*** 1.031*** 0.988*** 0.907***
(0.0267) (0.0117) (0.0335) (0.0293) (0.0649)
R^2 0.1 0.132 0.064 0.103 0.097
No. observations 1,128,388 373,851 754,537 847,221 281,167
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Table 5. Reduced Form Regressions: Effect of EXTIME on Labor Supply Outcomes
2 Years Later 
(2007)
3 Years Later 
(2008)
4 Years Later 
(2009)
A. Dependent Variable = Earn >= $1,000/Year
EXTIME ‐0.00502*** ‐0.00523*** ‐0.00367***
(0.000740) (0.000732) (0.000713)
R^2 0.086 0.088 0.079
B. Dependent Variable = Earn >= SGA
EXTIME ‐0.00191*** ‐0.00212*** ‐0.00172***
(0.000555) (0.000579) (0.000539)
R^2 0.049 0.054 0.05
C. Dependent Variable = Earnings
EXTIME ‐75.16*** ‐68.86*** ‐54.45**
(22.57) (21.06) (22.09)
R^2 0.065 0.062 0.054
No. observations 1,128,388 1,107,114 1,079,575
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Table 6. Reduced Form Regressions: Effect of EXTIME on Labor Supply Outcomes
2 Years Later 
(2007)
3 Years Later 
(2008)
4 Years Later 
(2009)
2 Years Later 
(2007)
3 Years Later 
(2008)
4 Years Later 
(2009)
A. Dependent Variable = Earn >= $1,000/Year
EXTIME ‐0.00310*** ‐0.00398*** ‐0.00273*** ‐0.00616*** ‐0.00583*** ‐0.00408***
(0.000974) (0.000965) (0.000917) (0.000946) (0.000934) (0.000903)
R^2 0.057 0.061 0.057 0.079 0.081 0.074
B. Dependent Variable = Earn >= SGA
EXTIME ‐8.51E‐04 ‐0.00110* ‐0.000953* ‐0.00280*** ‐0.00282*** ‐0.00223***
(0.000602) (0.000573) (0.000562) (0.000753) (0.000776) (0.000709)
R^2 0.038 0.04 0.04 0.046 0.051 0.048
C. Dependent Variable = Earnings
EXTIME ‐49.58 ‐70.56** ‐17.6 ‐100.2*** ‐74.95*** ‐77.25***
(37.29) (29.36) (38.52) (25.95) (26.03) (24.29)
R^2 0.044 0.045 0.032 0.084 0.073 0.07
No. observations 373,851 361,625 346,848 754,537 745,489 732,727
Initially Allowed Initially Denied
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Table 7. Reduced Form Regressions: Effect of EXTIME on Labor Supply Outcomes
2 Years Later 
(2007)
3 Years Later 
(2008)
4 Years Later 
(2009)
2 Years Later 
(2007)
3 Years Later 
(2008)
4 Years Later 
(2009)
A. Dependent Variable = Earn >= $1,000/Year
EXTIME ‐0.00478*** ‐0.00460*** ‐0.00294*** ‐0.00612*** ‐0.00797*** ‐0.00665***
(0.000821) (0.000815) (0.000780) (0.001730) (0.001670) (0.001750)
R^2 0.086 0.089 0.079 0.085 0.088 0.081
B. Dependent Variable = Earn >= SGA
EXTIME ‐0.00136** ‐0.00172*** ‐0.00108* ‐0.00419*** ‐0.00376*** ‐0.00437***
(0.000611) (0.000635) (0.000596) (0.001330) (0.001400) (0.001270)
R^2 0.049 0.054 0.05 0.049 0.055 0.053
C. Dependent Variable = Earnings
EXTIME ‐55.31** ‐53.69** ‐31.83 ‐159.1*** ‐131.6*** ‐149.4***
(25.39) (23.39) (25.06) (48.10) (48.85) (47.03)
R^2 0.064 0.062 0.053 0.072 0.063 0.063
No. observations 847,221 830,884 809,855 281,167 276,230 269,720
Non‐Prototype Prototype
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Table 8. Effect of EXTIME on Conditional Waiting Times and Pathways
Outcome N
Mean 
Dep. Var.
Coeff. on 
EXTIME Std. Error R^2
A. Non‐Prototype States
Time to Initial Decision 847,221 3.901 0.895*** (0.009) 0.149
Initial Denial 847,221 0.674 0.00223 (0.001) 0.204
Appeal to Recon. | Initial Denial 571,413 0.538 0.00266* (0.001) 0.064
Time to Recon. Decision | Appeal to Recon. 307,446 8.943 0.904*** (0.013) 0.143
Recon. Denial | Appeal to Recon. 307,446 0.889 ‐0.00151* (0.001) 0.054
Appeal to ALJ | Recon. Denial 273,260 0.73 0.00551*** (0.001) 0.064
Time to ALJ Decision | Appeal to ALJ 242,733 32.57 0.822*** (0.048) 0.145
ALJ Denial | Appealed to ALJ 242,733 0.184 ‐0.00251** (0.001) 0.069
Time to Higher Appeal Decision | Higher Appeal† 4,777 47.55 1.391*** (0.332) 0.233
Time to ReapplicaƟon Decision | ReapplicaƟon† 21,955 30.38 0.734*** (0.168) 0.360
Time to Last Observed Decision 847,221 12.73 0.988*** (0.029) 0.103
Receive Benefit 847,221 0.66 0.00308*** (0.001) 0.127
B. Prototype States
Time to Initial Decision 281,167 3.632 0.886*** (0.010) 0.117
Initial Denial 281,167 0.651 ‐0.00307 (0.003) 0.212
Appeal to ALJ | Initial Denial 183,124 0.547 0.0100*** (0.002) 0.086
Time to ALJ Decision | Appeal to ALJ 100,112 28.67 0.725*** (0.098) 0.147
ALJ Denial | Appealed to ALJ 100,112 0.179 ‐0.00163 (0.002) 0.070
Time to Higher Appeal Decision | Higher Appeal† 1,901 44.51 0.356 (0.605) 0.233
Time to ReapplicaƟon Decision | ReapplicaƟon† 7,189 29.48 ‐0.0812 (0.340) 0.375
Time to Last Observed Decision 281,167 12.57 0.907*** (0.065) 0.097
Receive Benefit 281,167 0.69 0.00560*** (0.002) 0.134
Notes: † = ulƟmate allowances only
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2 Years 
Later 
(2007)
3 Years 
Later 
(2008)
4 Years 
Later 
(2009)
2 Years 
Later 
(2007)
3 Years 
Later 
(2008)
4 Years 
Later 
(2009)
A. Dependent Variable = Earn >= $1,000/Year
Final time ‐0.000591** ‐0.00102***‐0.000871***‐0.00369*** ‐0.00471*** ‐0.00323***
(0.000236) (0.000232) (0.000229) (0.001160) (0.001150) (0.001090)
R^2 0.057 0.061 0.057 0.056 0.061 0.056
B. Dependent Variable = Earn >= SGA
Final time ‐0.000873***‐0.000801***‐0.000843*** ‐0.00101 ‐0.00130* ‐0.00113*
(0.000138) (0.000144) (0.000135) (0.000716) (0.000678) (0.000664)
R^2 0.038 0.04 0.04 0.038 0.04 0.04
C. Dependent Variable = Earnings
Final time ‐21.35*** ‐32.21*** ‐31.53*** ‐59 ‐83.52** ‐20.82
(6.88) (5.62) (6.05) (44.34) (34.74) (45.48)
R^2 0.044 0.045 0.032 0.044 0.045 0.032
No. observations 373,851 361,625 346,848 373,851 361,625 346,848
OLS IV
Table 9. OLS and IV Regressions: Effect of Time to Initial Decision on Labor Supply Outcomes for Initially 
Allowed Applicants
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Initial Denials… … also Denied in an ALJ Hearing
… with no Reconsideration or 
ALJ Hearing
N= 62,660 304,425
Year Cumulative Percentage Cumulative Percentage
2005 0.2 1.0
2006 0.8 4.4
2007 3.0 8.0
2008 6.6 10.8
2009 10.0 13.0
2010 12.5 14.7
Appendix Table 1. Percentage of Claimants Initially Denied in 2005 Receiving SSDI 
Benefits, by Year
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Average processing time for decisions 
made in 2005, months All Non‐Prototype Prototype
Mean 3.0 3.1 2.8
(1.0) (1.1) (0.8)
10th percentile 2.0 2.0 1.9
25th percentile 2.4 2.4 2.3
Median 2.8 2.9 2.7
75th percentile 3.4 3.5 3.2
90th percentile 4.2 4.3 3.7
n 8,769 6,723 2,046
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Appendix Table 2. Summary Statistics for DDS Examiners
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No
Yes
Step 1: 
Engaging in 
SGA?
Step 2: Severe 
Impairment?
Step 3: 
Impairment 
Meet Listing?
Step 4: 
Capacity for 
Past Job?
Denial
No
Denial
Yes
Allow
Yes
Denial
Allow
Figure 1. Five‐Step Review Process
Yes
Step 5: 
Capacity for 
Any Job?
No
Yes
Denial
No
No
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Non‐Prototype States
Prototype States
Initial  
DDS 
Review
Allow
Deny
Appeal to 
Recon. 
No Appeal
Allow
Deny
Appeal to 
ALJ
No Appeal
Allow
Deny
Higher 
Appeals 
No Appeal
Allow
Deny
Initial  
DDS 
Review
Allow
Deny
Appeal to 
ALJ
No Appeal
Allow
Deny
Higher 
Appeals 
No Appeal
Allow
Deny
Figure 2. Initial and Appeals Process
N= 847,221
N= 275,808
N= 571,413
N= 307,446
N= 263,967
N= 34,186
N= 273,260
N= 242,733*
N= 73,690
N=198,014
N=44,719
N=4,777
N=281,167
N=98,043
N=183,124
N=100,112
N=83,012
N=82,171
N=17,941
N=1,901
* Some ALJ appeals are observed without an observed 
reconsideration appeal. 
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Labor 
Supply
Denied 
Applicant
Allowed 
Applicant
Figure 3. Model of the Effects of SSDI Processing Time and Benefit Receipt on Labor Supply
γ
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Figure 4
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Source: 2005 DIODS Data. Examiners with 10 - 900 decisions only.
Caseload characteristics includes DDS, geography, body system code,
age, pre-onset earnings, concurrent status, and Terminal Illness diagnosis.
Deviations from the Mean Examiner Time:
Raw and Adjusted for Caseload Characteristics
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